

Dominance

In 35 jurisdictions worldwide

Contributing editors

Thomas Janssens and Thomas Wessely



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GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH 

Romania

Raluca Vasilache, Anca Jurcovan and Andreea Opreșan

Țuca Zbârcea & Asociații

General

1 Legislation

What is the legislation applying specifically to the behaviour of dominant firms?

The abusive behaviour of dominant firms is prohibited by article 6 of the Romanian Competition Law No. 21/1996 (RCL) and article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Article 6 expressly prohibits the abuse of a dominant position held by one or more undertakings on the Romanian market or on a substantial part of it. According to the RCL, abusive practices may, inter alia, consist of:

- directly or indirectly imposing unfair selling or purchase prices, tariffs or other unfair trading conditions and the refusal to deal with specific suppliers or beneficiaries;
- limiting production, trade or technical development to the prejudice of the consumers;
- applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
- making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations, which neither by their nature nor according to commercial usage, have any connection with the subject of such contracts;
- using excessive or predatory prices for the purpose of excluding the competitors or selling to export below the production cost by covering the differences through imposing higher prices to internal consumers; or
- exploiting the economic dependence of an undertaking, which does not have an alternative solution under equivalent conditions and terminating the contractual relations for the sole reason that the partner refuses to obey unjustified trade conditions.

2 Non-dominant to dominant firm

Does the law cover conduct through which a non-dominant company becomes dominant?

The attempts of a non-dominant player to gain market shares through an aggressive M&A strategy would normally be subject to merger control and censured, if necessary, within this context. Under the RCL, article 12, the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) may prohibit economic concentrations that lead or might lead to a significant restriction of effective competition on the Romanian market or any part thereof, in particular, by creating or strengthening a dominant position. The authority has, however, made limited use of this provision, preferring to impose remedies on the merging parties.

3 Object of legislation

Is the object of the legislation and the underlying standard a strictly economic one or does it protect other interests?

The Romanian legislature states as primary objectives of the antitrust law the protection and growth of competition on the market and the support of consumers' welfare. The RCC's practice showed an increased focus on consumers. In one case, a couple of cable-TV operators were found to have been abusive for not complying with the contracts concluded with their subscribers.

Sustaining the market position of small and medium-sized businesses, although not specifically reiterated under article 6 of the RCL, could be considered as an objective to be protected within the context of control on abuse of a dominant position. In the recent *Telecoms* case, the RCC severely fined the two major mobile operators for blocking the market access of a small operator in the early stages of its market development. The case is pending before the Romanian courts.

4 Non-dominant firms

Are there any rules applying to the unilateral conduct of non-dominant firms?

The RCL provides no sanctions for the unilateral conduct of non-dominant companies. Beyond the level of dominance and independent of antitrust control, certain commercial practices of non-dominant players (sale at loss, tying sale, etc) could be fined in a softer manner, by the consumers' protection offices or fiscal authorities under separate enactments.

When dealing with cases of abuse solely affecting the domestic market, the RCC seems to rely on article 3(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003, assuming that it is not bound to apply article 102 concepts or the interpretations of different forms of abuse given by the EC bodies, and may impose stricter national rules.

This translates in rather original approaches taken by the RCC on different forms of abuse. Article 6 of the RCL provides a more detailed list of potential forms of abuse than the corresponding article 102 of the TFEU. For example, in addition to a case similarly regulated by both article 6 and article 102(a) ('directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions'), the RCL, article 6(e) incriminates separately the application of excessive or predatory pricing. The RCC interpreted this distinction, inferring that 'unfair prices' is a stand-alone concept under the RCL, which is different from 'excessive prices or predatory prices' as traditionally perceived under EC practice.

5 Sector-specific control

Is dominance regulated according to sector?

Network industries such as telecommunications, postal services, energy, and railway transport are regulated by specific rules to facilitate market liberalisation and ensure a competitive environment. These specific rules are directly applied by the relevant sector regulatory bodies. Nevertheless, topics concerning access to infrastructure or other anti-competitive practices of the incumbent operators in the specific sectors could also be dealt with by the RCC under the general rules on abuse of dominant position.

Relatively recently, the RCC applied significant fines to operators acting in the postal services, as well as in telecommunications sector.

6 Status of sector-specific provisions

What is the relationship between the sector-specific provisions and the general abuse of dominance legislation?

The application of specific remedies provided by the sector regulatory framework does not negate the competence of the RCC to deal with the same case on abuse of dominance position grounds. While the regulatory bodies mainly act as mediators between the market players and industry regulators, they may also apply some fines; the fines with the greatest dissuasive effect are still those under the power of the RCC.

As a matter of principle, the relevant regulatory bodies generally benefit from ex ante rights related to market behaviour, while the RCC intervenes ex post. The RCC has recently taken over the role of arbitrator in the railway sector, supervising potential disputes between the incumbent operator and new entrants.

7 Enforcement record

How frequently is the legislation used in practice?

During its nearly 17-year existence, the RCC has concluded just a few cases with a finding of an abuse of dominant position. Many investigations have been opened following complaints on the grounds of both abuse of dominance and collusion, but the authority has more often penalised entities for anti-competitive agreements (cartels) or closed investigations on grounds that no infringement was identified.

Although in past years the authority has dismissed many complaints regarding abuse of dominance, it has also applied record fines in abuse cases, for instance:

- in a case of abusive refusal to deal and discriminatory pricing applied by the national freight railway operator to private operators for access to sleeping and maintenance premises;
- in unfair pricing applied by cable-TV operators located in Bucharest;
- in a recent abuse case against the National Company of Romanian Mail for applying dissimilar conditions to its commercial partners; and
- in the latest case against two major players in mobile telecommunications for refusal to grant a small operator network access for termination of calls originated from international sources or from networks operated by competing operators, as well as traffic limitation for inter-connection calls generated in the network of the small operator (in the case of one sanctioned undertaking such limitation was applied for a few hours during one day).

8 Economics

What is the role of economics in the application of the dominance provisions?

There is still little practice developed by the RCC regarding economics and the abuse of dominant position, and the existing case law does not offer many complex and precedential cases as to allow more certainty for the business environment to perform valid economic assessments of their market behaviour.

However, the increasingly sophisticated and refined economic analysis on dominance submitted by the allegedly dominant companies may force the RCC to refine its assessment. The RCC is showing signs that it is moving in this direction.

9 Scope of application of dominance provisions

To whom do the dominance provisions apply? To what extent do they apply to public entities?

Although the case law of the RCC does not offer guidance in this respect, public entities could be subject to allegations of abuse of dominance, to the extent that their activities qualify as economic activities.

On the other hand, article 9 of the RCL bans any actions or omissions of central or local public authorities or institutions (or entities delegated by such bodies) that prevent, restrict or distort competition, for instance by limiting free trade or undertakings' independence, or by setting discriminatory conditions for undertakings' market activities.

10 Definition of dominance

How is dominance defined?

The RCC practice has defined dominance by referring to cases where an undertaking is able to behave, to an appreciable extent, independently towards its competitors or clients on the relevant market.

Nevertheless, from July 2011, the RCL has provided a threshold for market dominance. See the comments related to the presumption of dominance under question 12.

11 Market definition

What is the test for market definition?

Based on the European Commission's notice of market definition (substantially implemented at national level), the RCC upheld the notion that there could be different approaches to market definition according to the context of the analysis: in merger cases, an ex ante assessment on the market could result in different views on the relevant market than in ex post analysis conducted in infringement cases. Consequently, the authority takes a broader view of the market in merger cases than in dominance cases.

This distinction was upheld in a 2006 case on abuse of dominant position in the cable TV market. In merger cases this market was traditionally seen from 1998 to 2005 as a national market from the geographical perspective. In 2006, however, the RCC decided in a case on abuse of dominant position that the cable TV market has a local dimension, smaller than the borders of one city, limited to each operator's network location. As a result, each operator could be seen as monopolist for its area of operations (even as small as one street in a given area) where no other competitor has a parallel infrastructure.

This is a typical case where the market power of the incumbent operator has not been assessed by applying the typical criteria, as the RCC relies more on the type of network industry investigated and the alleged lack of consumers' alternatives within a specific area covered by just one operator. The lack of alternatives has also been upheld to establish a monopolistic position of the dominant railway freight carrier on certain secondary services markets.

However, in the recent case in the mobile telecommunications sector, the RCC did not seem to depart from the principles established by the European Commission on the relevant markets applicable to electronic communications products and services under ex ante assessment, as well as the views expressed by the regulatory body in the sector on the definition of the relevant market.

12 Market-share threshold

Is there a market-share threshold above which a company will be presumed to be dominant?

Pursuant to its latest amendment, the RCL establishes a relative presumption of dominance above a market share threshold of 40 per cent. Therefore, if such a market share is exceeded, the burden of proof on the absence of a dominant position is transferred to the undertakings under investigation.

Since the entry into force of the latest amendment (July 2011), the RCC has not finalised an abuse case. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to expect that in overturning the presumption of dominance, undertakings may use economic market arguments such as the market shares of nearby competitors, actual barriers to entry on the market, competitors' capacity to react against the anti-competitive behaviour and the nature of the product.

13 Collective dominance

Is collective dominance covered by the legislation? If so, how is it defined?

Article 6 of the RCL covers the abusive behaviour of one or more undertakings holding a dominant position. No further guidance is provided as to the elements indicating collective dominance. In a 2005 case, the RCC investigated a potential collective dominance on the cement market, but finally upheld a price-fixing agreement between the three competitors each holding market shares between 30 and 35 per cent.

In the recent case against the two most important players in the mobile telecommunications sector, the authority did not withhold a collective dominance position, but instead issued two separate abuse decisions against each sanctioned undertaking.

14 Dominant purchasers

Does the legislation also apply to dominant purchasers? If so, are there any differences compared with the application of the law to dominant suppliers?

Since the RCL does not distinguish between the parties in a supply relationship that may exercise market power, it could be assumed that abusive

behaviour by a powerful buyer could also be caught under the provisions on abuse.

Abuse in general

15 Definition

How is abuse defined? Does your law follow an effects-based or a form-based approach to identifying anti-competitive conduct?

Article 6 of the RCL stipulates a list of potentially abusive practices and the expected negative effects on the market (damage to consumers' welfare). The RCC does not appear to follow an effects-based approach, but rather to consider such practices as per se abusive without quantifying their actual market effects.

16 Exploitative and exclusionary practices

Does the concept of abuse cover both exploitative and exclusionary practices?

Both exploitative and exclusionary practices are covered by the concept of abuse under the RCL.

17 Link between dominance and abuse

What link must be shown between dominance and abuse?

It is not obligatory that dominance and abuse occur in the same market. Abuse could be manifested in a neighbouring market from the one in which the undertaking is dominant.

18 Defences

What defences may be raised to allegations of abuse of dominance? Is it possible to invoke efficiency gains?

Neither the RCL nor the practice of the RCC provides for general types of defences to be used in abuse of dominant position cases. Nevertheless, it could be expected that defence arguments accepted by the EC decision-making bodies (including efficiency gains) would work in similar cases at the national level.

Specific forms of abuse

19 Price and non-price discrimination

The application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties is sanctioned by the RCL, article 6(c). In a 2005 case, the RCC rejected the discrimination allegations lodged by one distributor against Colgate Palmolive. The plaintiff invoked the non-equal terms granted to Cash & Carry Channel versus the traditional distributors. Although in 2005 the authority found the differentiation between the two channels justifiable since they were not found as competing on the same market, in early 2007 the RCC reopened the case on the same grounds. However, the order of the RCC on the opening of this investigation has been recently annulled in court, which is considered to be a highlight as a first in the Romanian courts' practice.

A substantial fine of approximately €7.2 million has already been imposed by the RCC in 2006 for an abuse of dominant position in the form of applying dissimilar conditions to trade partners in the case concerning the activity of the National Company for Freight Railway Transport. More recently, at the end of 2010, the RCC imposed a fine of around €24.06 million on the National Company of Romanian Mail, namely 7.2 per cent of its 2009 turnover, for similar behaviour (ie, applying dissimilar conditions to its trading partners).

In 2012, the RCC rejected the interim measures proposed by an airline operator concerning the reduction of the transfer and transit fees imposed by an airport, as well as the elimination of discriminatory criteria for granting discounts on airport charges.

The RCC is currently analysing the commitments made by four telecom operators in order to eliminate the competition concerns that had led to the opening of an investigation in 2011 regarding the possible discrimination in relation to the fee level for the call termination service at the mobile points of the individual network (of each telecom operator). The telecom operators applied different fees for call termination depending on the origin of the calls (calls initiated and terminated in the same network, and calls initiated in one network and terminated in a different network).

20 Exploitative prices or terms of supply

The practice of the RCC does not provide clear guidelines regarding the economic analysis of a price-versus-cost structure that could reveal anti-competitive elements. If, with respect to excessive or predatory prices, the EC practice could be used as a standard, apparently the RCC acknowledges a separate concept of 'unfair pricing' that could substantiate an abuse, based on the specific provisions of the RCL that adds to the EC concepts. In one case, the RCC found the monthly fees charged by a telecoms operator that were increased in the absence of a corresponding cost increase for the same months as abusive and unfair. The case showed a very simplistic inference and left room for more erratic future assessments of the RCC on the pricing policies of market players.

21 Rebate schemes

No clear-cut guidance is found in the RCC's practice related to rebate schemes. The guidelines for vertical restraints provide, however, that quantity forcing, English clauses or similar non-compete obligations applied by dominant players are likely to be caught under the rules on abuse of dominant position.

22 Predatory pricing

Except for the guidelines on competition rules applicable to the telecoms sector, where predatory pricing is defined on a cost basis similar to that applied at the EC level, the RCC has not made use of the predatory price concept. The authority is, however, expected to follow common standards used at the EC level.

23 Price squeezes

The RCC's record shows no findings regarding margin or price squeezes.

24 Refusals to deal and access to essential facilities

Both refusal to deal and refusal of access to essential facilities are covered in article 6 of the RCL. In a 2006 decision of the authority, the national railway freight carrier was sanctioned for refusing to grant access to the roundhouses within its property to other private carriers.

More recently, in 2011, the two major mobile telecommunications operators were fined for refusing call termination access to their respective networks.

The fine applied by the RCC in its 2011 abuse case on the refusal to grant access tops the authority's fine record in terms of overall value. Such circumstances are generated by the large turnover of the sanctioned undertakings.

25 Exclusive dealing, non-compete provisions and single branding

Single branding obligations imposed by a dominant undertaking could be qualified as an abuse of dominant position.

26 Tying and leveraging

The RCL prohibits tying practices (making the conclusion of an agreement conditional upon acceptance of additional obligations that are unrelated by their nature or according to commercial use to the subject of such an agreement) under article 6(d).

27 Limiting production, markets or technical development

The limitation of production, distribution and technical development is covered by the prohibitions stipulated under article 6(b) of the RCL. In a 1997 decision concerning Trafo SA, the RCC decided that the decision of the undertaking not to supply raw materials to competitors, thus limiting distribution to the prejudice of consumers, was abusive.

28 Abuse of intellectual property rights

The RCC has not yet applied the more developed EC standard of analysis on abuse of intellectual property rights, but it could be expected that the general guidelines developed in EC case law would be followed by the domestic authority.

29 Abuse of government process

There is no reference in the RCL on the abuse of government process or in the competition authority's practice, but it is possible that such abusive

conduct could be penalised under national law in cases similar to precedents at EC level.

As indicated in question 9, the RCL bans any actions or omissions of central or local public authorities or institutions preventing, restricting or distorting competition.

30 'Structural abuses' – mergers and acquisitions as exclusionary practices

To prevent the creation or consolidation of a dominant position within the context of merger control rules, the RCC may impose remedies on the merging parties (sale of assets, trademark licensing or assignment, etc). For instance, in a relatively recent merger case between the two main players on the Romanian additive oil production market, the RCC made its approval of the economic concentration conditional upon a trademark assignment, allowing Agricover, the second-largest player, to maintain its presence on the market. By the same token, when analysing the intended merger between two players on the Romanian market for raw and coated particle boards, the RCC gave its approval, conditional upon the renunciation by Kronospan Group of the acquisition of the commercial division of raw and coated particle board manufacturer FunderMax GmbH Austria, with a view to rendering the operation compatible with the market.

In a more recent case on the dialysis services market, Fresenius Medical Care Beteiligungsgesellschaft's acquisition of Nefromed SRL and Nefromed Dialysis Centers SRL was authorised subject to Fresenius' undertaking to divest two dialysis centres.

31 Other types of abuse

The RCL lists only the most common abusive practices. The list is not exhaustive and the RCC is competent to assess all potential abusive conduct of a dominant undertaking that may affect competition on the market or consumer welfare. Conduct that is contrary to article 102 of the TFEU is also likely to fall within the prohibition of article 6 of the RCL.

Enforcement proceedings

32 Prohibition of abusive practices

Is there a directly applicable prohibition of abusive practices or does the law only empower the regulatory authorities to take remedial actions against companies abusing their dominant position?

Private parties could directly seek compensation or other remedies before the domestic courts based on both article 6 of the RCL and article 102 of the TFEU. Nevertheless, because jurisprudence concerning applying anti-trust rules is comparatively undeveloped, Romanian courts might feel reluctant to accept damages actions based on tort law in the absence of a decision of the RCC establishing the abuse of dominant position. It could be assumed, then, that the success of damages claims before the courts would increase significantly if the alleged infringement was previously established by the RCC.

33 Enforcement authorities

Which authorities are responsible for enforcement and what powers of investigation do they have?

The RCL is primarily enforced by the RCC. Its decision-making structure consists of seven members appointed by the President of Romania at the government's proposal, who are assisted in their activity by competition inspectors who are public officials with specific attributions. The RCC may initiate an investigation on abuse of dominant position ex officio or upon complaint.

During an investigation, the RCC's inspectors can:

- conduct on-site inspections and access premises or vehicles belonging to defendants;
- examine any documents, registers, accountancy and commercial papers, irrespective of the premises where they are held;
- interview representatives and employees of the defendant;
- copy or seize documents and registers of the company under investigation; and
- seal premises, documents or computers during a dawn raid.

Refusal to supply the required documents could trigger fines of up to 1 per cent of the turnover achieved by the company during the previous year. Also, punitive penalties of up to 5 per cent of the average daily turnover achieved in the previous year may be imposed until the documents requested are produced in a complete and correct way, or until the defendants submit to an inspection.

34 Sanctions and remedies

What sanctions and remedies may they impose?

For practices qualifying as abuse of dominant position, the RCC can apply fines ranging from 0.5 to 10 per cent of the turnover achieved by the defendant in the previous financial year. The highest fines imposed by the RCC for abuse of a dominant position were applied recently, namely at the end of 2010 against the National Company of Romanian Mail, amounting to approximately €24.06 million, and at the beginning of 2011 against the two major mobile telecommunications operators, Orange and Vodafone, amounting to approximately €34.8 million and €28.3 million respectively.

35 Impact on contracts

What are the consequences of an infringement for the validity of contracts entered into by dominant companies?

Article 49 of the RCL provides that any commitment, agreement or contractual clauses relating to an anti-competitive practice prohibited by article 6 of the RCL and article 102 TFEU are null and void.

**TUCA ZBARCEA
ASOCIATII**

Raluca Vasilache
Anca Jurcovan
Andreea Opreșan

raluca.vasilache@tuca.ro
anca.jurcovan@tuca.ro
andreea.oprisan@tuca.ro

4-8 Nicolae Titulescu Ave
America House, West Wing, 8th Floor
Sector 1, 011141 Bucharest
Romania

Tel: +40 21 204 88 90
Fax: +40 21 204 88 99
www.tuca.ro

36 Private enforcement

To what extent is private enforcement possible? Does the legislation provide a basis for a court or authority to order a dominant firm to grant access (to infrastructure or technology), supply goods or services or conclude a contract?

According to domestic competition rules, the national courts can rule on the validity of agreements that could substantiate an abuse of dominant position and award damages to the dominant party's clients or competitors for losses that have a causal link to the abuse. To our knowledge, there is no jurisprudence in the national courts compelling the dominant entity to grant access to different technologies, to supply goods or to conclude a specific contract.

37 Availability of damages

Do companies harmed by abusive practices have a claim for damages?

According to article 61 of the RCL, irrespective of the administrative fines or other remedies applied by the RCC, the injured parties are entitled to

damages caused by the abusive conduct. However, to our knowledge, in the absence of a decision of the RCC ruling on the existence of an abuse of dominance, there is no relevant jurisprudence on damages awarded by domestic courts.

38 Recent enforcement action

What is the most recent high-profile dominance case?

In its latest high-profile case, the authority applied record fines totalling €63.18 million on the two major mobile telecommunications operators for refusing access to their networks for call termination, exceeding the record of €24.06 million set in the previous abuse case against the National Company of Romanian Mail. The sanctioned undertakings appealed the RCC's decision. The cases are still before the courts and the decision is pending.

Although in 2010 and 2011 the RCC finalised two high-profile abuse cases, the case law of the RCC as regards the abuse of dominant position is still scarce and some old investigations targeting potential abuses are still pending before the RCC.